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Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc. (AVCV) is 
an Arizona nonprofit corporation that works to pro-
mote and protect crime victims’ interests throughout 
the criminal justice process.  To achieve these goals, 
AVCV empowers victims of crime through legal ad-
vocacy and social services.  AVCV also provides con-
tinuing legal education to the judiciary, lawyers, and 
law enforcement. 
AVCV seeks to foster a fair justice system that 
(1) provides crime victims with resources and infor-
mation to help them seek immediate crisis interven-
tion; (2) informs crime victims of their rights under 
the laws of the United States and Arizona; (3) en-
sures that crime victims fully understand those 
rights; and (4) promotes meaningful ways for crime 
victims to enforce their rights, including through di-
rect legal representation. 
Memory of Victims Everywhere to Rescue Justice 
(MOVE) was founded in California in 1988 by Gary 
and Collene Campbell to fight for justice and rights 
for all crime victims.  The Campbells’ son, Scott, was 
brutally murdered at the age of 27 when he was 
lured onto a Cessna airplane by a high school friend, 
flown out to sea, beaten, and thrown overboard in an 
apparent robbery attempt.  Since its founding, 
MOVE has been a national leader in calling for the 
ii 
 
enactment of constitutional rights for crime victims 
and for the vigorous enforcement of criminal laws to 
keep our communities and people safe. 
The National Crime Victim Law Institute 
(NCVLI) is a nonprofit educational organization lo-
cated at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, Ore-
gon.  NCVLI’s mission is to actively promote balance 
and fairness in the justice system through crime vic-
tim-centered legal advocacy, education, and resource 
sharing.  NCVLI accomplishes its mission through 
education and training; technical assistance to attor-
neys; promotion of the National Alliance of Victims’ 
Rights Attorneys; research and analysis of develop-
ments in crime victim law; and provision of infor-
mation on crime victim law to crime victims and oth-
er members of the public.  In addition, NCVLI 
actively participates as amicus curiae in cases across 
the Nation that involve crime victims’ rights. 
Amici have a keen interest in ensuring that courts 
have the benefit of information and policy insights as 
they perform the difficult task of safeguarding the 
rights of the accused while also vindicating the rights 
of crime victims—not to mention protecting the wider 
community.   
Measures like the one at issue in this case fur-
ther those goals by protecting victims’ rights, bring-
ing offenders to justice, and safeguarding communi-
ties.  They do not offend due process because the 
high risk that a sex offender will reoffend, combined 
with the devastating harm to victims and communi-
ties and the high risk of flight, justifies the determi-
nation that—certainly where the proof is evident or 
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presumption great—defendants charged with sexual 
assault are categorically ineligible for bail. 
Amici are concerned that if permitted to stand, 
the decision below will deprive the States of a much-
needed tool for keeping sexual assault victims and 
communities safe.  Nothing in the Constitution re-
quires—much less permits—that unfortunate result.  
Amici respectfully request that the Court grant their 
motion, grant the petition, and reverse the judgment 
below. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE* 
Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc. (AVCV) is 
an Arizona nonprofit corporation that works to pro-
mote and protect crime victims’ interests throughout 
the criminal justice process.  To achieve these goals, 
AVCV empowers victims of crime through legal ad-
vocacy and social services.  AVCV also provides con-
tinuing legal education to the judiciary, lawyers, and 
law enforcement. 
AVCV seeks to foster a fair justice system that 
(1) provides crime victims with resources and infor-
mation to help them seek immediate crisis interven-
tion; (2) informs crime victims of their rights under 
the laws of the United States and Arizona; (3) en-
sures that crime victims fully understand those 
rights; and (4) promotes meaningful ways for crime 
victims to enforce their rights, including through di-
rect legal representation. 
Memory of Victims Everywhere to Rescue Justice 
(MOVE) was founded in California in 1988 by Gary 
and Collene Campbell to fight for justice and rights 
for all crime victims.  The Campbells’ son, Scott, was 
                                                
 * Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici represent that 
this brief was not authored in whole or in part by any party or 
counsel for any party.  No person or party other than amici, 
their members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution 
to the preparation or submission of this brief.  Counsel of record 
for all parties received notice of the filing of this brief in compli-
ance with Supreme Court Rule 37.2.  Petitioner consented to 
the filing of this brief, but Respondent withheld consent. 
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brutally murdered at the age of 27 when he was 
lured onto a Cessna airplane by a high school friend, 
flown out to sea, beaten, and thrown overboard.  
Since its founding, MOVE has been a national leader 
in calling for the enactment of constitutional rights 
for crime victims and for the vigorous enforcement of 
criminal laws to keep our communities and people 
safe. 
The National Crime Victim Law Institute 
(NCVLI) is a nonprofit educational organization lo-
cated at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, Ore-
gon.  NCVLI’s mission is to actively promote balance 
and fairness in the justice system through crime vic-
tim–centered legal advocacy, education, and resource 
sharing.  NCVLI accomplishes its mission through 
education and training; technical assistance to attor-
neys; promotion of the National Alliance of Victims’ 
Rights Attorneys; research and analysis of develop-
ments in crime victim law; and provision of infor-
mation on crime victim law to crime victims and oth-
er members of the public.  In addition, NCVLI 
actively participates as amicus curiae in cases across 
the Nation that involve crime victims’ rights. 
Amici have a keen interest in ensuring that courts 
have the information and policy insights needed to 
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused 
while vindicating the rights of crime victims—not to 
mention protecting the wider community.  Nothing in 
the Constitution prohibits the States from empower-
ing courts to protect crime victims by denying bail 
when—as determined by a court after a full and fair 
adversarial process—the proof is evident that a de-
fendant committed a sexually violent offense.  This 
Court’s intervention is sorely needed to ensure that 
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when, as here, States act well within the Constitution 
to protect crime victims and keep communities safe, 
courts are not permitted to improperly thwart those 
efforts. 
STATEMENT 
1. In 2002, over 80 percent of Arizona voters 
approved Proposition 103, which amended Arizona’s 
constitution by rendering a defendant categorically 
ineligible for bail if “the proof is evident or the pre-
sumption great” that he committed sexual assault.  
Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22(A)(1); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-
3961(A)(2). 
Sexual assault under Arizona law is rape:  “in-
tentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual inter-
course or oral sexual contact with any person with-
out consent.”  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1406(A).1 
Arizonans approved Proposition 103 “both to en-
sure that sexual predators facing potential life sen-
tences would be present for trial and to keep ‘rapists 
and child molesters’ from endangering others while 
awaiting trial.”  Pet. App. 9.  As one legislator ex-
plained, “ ‘sexual predators * * * know they could be 
facing lifetime incarceration’ and therefore ‘ha[ve] no 
incentive to ever return’ to court, making Proposition 
                                                
 1 See Nat’l Inst. of Just., Rape and Sexual Violence (DOJ 
2017), https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/rape-sexual-violence/Pages/ 
welcome.aspx (“Most statutes currently define rape as noncon-
sensual oral, anal, or vaginal penetration of the victim by body 
parts or objects”); Office of Pub. Affairs, An Updated Definition 
of Rape (DOJ 2012), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/ 
updated-definition-rape (defining rape as “penetration, no mat-
ter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or ob-
ject, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, with-
out the consent of the victim”). 
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103 necessary to ‘keep dangerous sexual predators 
off our streets.’”  Pet. App. 9 (alterations in original).  
Proposition 103 was adopted “to ‘prevent the worst 
sexual predators from jumping bail or even simply 
walking our neighborhoods,’ stopping ‘rapists and 
child molesters’ from reoffending, and treating ‘bail 
for rapists and child molesters * * * like bail for 
murderers.’”  Pet. App. 9–10 (alterations in original). 
By denying bail when—as determined by a court 
after an adversarial proceeding—the proof is evident 
that a defendant committed a sexually violent of-
fense, Proposition 103 helps ensure that victims of 
sexual assault receive the full panoply of protections 
they are guaranteed by the Arizona constitution—
including the right to be “treated with fairness, re-
spect, and dignity” and to be “free from intimidation, 
harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal jus-
tice process.”  Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(A)(1).2 
2. Respondent Guy James Goodman—after be-
ing confronted with DNA evidence—pleaded guilty to 
sexual assault for creeping into his victim’s bedroom, 
crawling into bed with her, pulling down her under-
wear, and penetrating her with his fingers.  Pet. 
App. 5–6, 88. 
                                                
 2 Arizona is by no means unique in guaranteeing crime vic-
tims certain constitutionally protected rights.  See, e.g., Cal. 
Const. art. I, § 28(b)(1) (“a victim shall * * * be free from intimi-
dation, harassment, and abuse, throughout the criminal or ju-
venile justice process”); Or. Const. art. I, § 43(1)(a) (granting 
victims the “right to be reasonably protected from the criminal 
defendant or the convicted criminal throughout the criminal 
justice process”).  Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1), (a)(8) (guarantee-
ing victims right “to be reasonably protected from the accused” 
and “to be treated with fairness and with respect”). 
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Just before his arrest, the Arizona Supreme 
Court held that Proposition 103 could not be consti-
tutionally applied to defendants charged with sexual 
conduct with a minor.  Simpson v. Miller, 387 P.3d 
1270 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Arizona v. 
Martinez, 138 S. Ct. 146 (2017).  The court held that 
criminal sexual conduct with a minor was not a suffi-
cient proxy for future dangerousness because, in ad-
dition to criminalizing the defendant’s conduct—
molesting children under fifteen when he was in his 
twenties and thirties—the statute also arguably 
criminalized consensual sex between teenagers.  Id. 
at 1278. 
Relying on Simpson, the trial court in the instant 
case ruled that Goodman was entitled to bond.  Even 
though the proof was evident that Goodman sexually 
assaulted the victim, the court concluded that the 
State failed to prove he presented “a substantial 
danger to other persons or the community.”  Pet. 
App. 84. 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that 
“[s]exual assault remains a non-bailable offense.”  
Pet. App. 76.  Unlike sexual conduct with a minor, 
which encompasses statutory rape, “the non-
consensual nature of [sexual assault] fulfills the re-
quirement for finding inherent dangerousness.”  Pet. 
App. 81. 
3. In a sharply divided 4-3 decision, the Arizona 
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that data regarding 
sex offenders’ high “post-conviction recidivism rates 
do not inherently demonstrate that a person charged 
with sexual assault will likely commit another sexual 
assault if released pending trial.”  Pet. App. 16 (em-
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phasis added); see also Pet. App. 13 (requiring proof 
“that most persons charged with sexual assault, or 
even a significant number, would likely commit an-
other sexual assault or otherwise dangerous crime 
pending trial if released on bail”).  The court brushed 
aside the risk that someone potentially facing life 
imprisonment, involuntary commitment, and lifetime 
registration as a sex offender inherently poses a 
flight risk because not all offenders will face such 
dire consequences.  Pet. App. 11. 
4. Justice Clint Bolick—author of the Simpson 
majority opinion—dissented, joined by two other jus-
tices.  His dissent emphasized that “sexual assault is 
by definition a uniquely horrific act, in which a per-
son’s most intimate parts are violated through force, 
coercion, or deception.”  Pet. App. 24.  He would have 
held that Proposition 103 withstands scrutiny be-
cause this Court has made clear that “a state may 
categorically regulate sex offenders as a class for 
public safety purposes, both because of the uniquely 
horrific nature of the crimes and sex offenders’ pro-
pensity for recidivism.”  Pet. App. 26–27 (citing 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)).  Justice Bolick 
concluded by “urg[ing]” this Court to intervene.  Pet. 
App. 30–31. 
Justice Gould, joined by Justice Lopez, authored 
a separate dissent.  He criticized the majority for de-
parting from this Court’s decision in United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), concerning the proper 
standard for facial constitutional challenges, and for 
imposing “an impossible standard” on the State.  Pet. 
App. 31–32. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As this Court recognized in Smith v. Doe, releas-
ing sex offenders pending trial presents a substantial 
danger to the community because the “risk of recidi-
vism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and 
high.’”  538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (“high rate of recidi-
vism among convicted sex offenders” means they 
pose risk of future “dangerousness as a class”).  
When “sex offenders reenter society, they are much 
more likely than any other type of offender to be re-
arrested for a new rape or sexual assault.”  McKune 
v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (plurality) (“Sex of-
fenders are a serious threat in this Nation.”); see also 
United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 395–96 
(2013) (“recidivism rates among sex offenders are 
higher than the average for other types of criminals”). 
The damage inflicted when sex offenders reoffend 
is drastic and severe—for both victims and their 
communities.  “Sexual assault is by definition an ex-
tremely dangerous crime.”  Pet. App. 23 (Bolick, J., 
dissenting).  As this Court has explained, sexual as-
sault “is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense 
and in its almost total contempt for the personal in-
tegrity and autonomy” of the victim—“[s]hort of hom-
icide, it is the ‘ultimate violation of self.’”  Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977); see also Pet. 
App. 11 (majority) (“sexual assault is a deplorable 
crime that endangers and dehumanizes victims”). 
Because the punishment should fit the crime, the 
consequences of a sexual assault conviction are (or at 
least strive to be) as drastic and severe as the harm 
inflicted on victims and communities.  Convicted sex 
offenders face not only potentially lengthy prison 
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sentences, but also the possibility of indefinite invol-
untary commitment after completing that sentence.  
E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1406(B)–(D) (providing 
sentencing range of five years to life, with no possi-
bility of parole); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-3701 et seq. (in-
voluntary commitment). 
Even after their release from state custody, sex 
offenders face serious collateral consequences of their 
conviction—in particular, having to register as a 
convicted sex offender and comply with the at-
tendant regulatory schemes.  E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 13-3821 et seq. 
As several members of this Court have noted, 
registering as a sex offender entails numerous, life-
long social, economic, and psychological consequenc-
es.  See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 99 (describing “the 
attendant humiliation” and “public shame” that are 
“collateral consequence[s]” of registration); id. at 109 
& n.* (Souter, J., concurring) (describing “the severi-
ty of the burdens imposed * * * such as exclusion 
from jobs or housing, harassment, and physical 
harm”); id. at 112 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is also 
clear beyond peradventure that these unique [regis-
tration and reporting] consequences of conviction of a 
sex offense are punitive.”); id. at 115–16 (Ginsburg, 
J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting) (registration “re-
semble[s] historically common forms of punishment” 
and is “punitive in effect”). 
As a result of these exceedingly serious conse-
quences, releasing sex offenders pending trial pre-
sents a substantial danger to the community not only 
because the “risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders 
is ‘frightening and high,’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 
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(majority), but also because the risk of sex offenders 
fleeing justice is equally high.  To address these seri-
ous public policy and criminal justice concerns, 
States across the Nation have taken steps to ensure 
that sex offenders are brought to justice, victims are 
protected, and communities are safeguarded.   
At issue in this case is one such measure—
denying bail in sexual assault cases once a court is 
satisfied, after a full adversarial hearing, that the 
“proof” of sexual assault “is evident or the presump-
tion great.”  Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22(A)(1); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. § 13-3961(A)(2). 
As the State has ably demonstrated in its peti-
tion (at 11–16), the conclusion of the court below that 
this measured, common-sense approach violates due 
process cannot be reconciled with this Court’s cases, 
which have made clear that the Constitution does 
not prohibit denying bail to defendants who present 
(1) “a continuing danger to the community” or (2) “a 
risk of flight.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 749 (1987).  Nor does the Constitution prohibit 
categorically denying bail based on the nature of the 
charged offense.  Id. at 753–54.  Indeed, thirty-four 
states categorically deny bail to persons charged 
with capital offenses, murder, specified sex offenses, 
or offenses punishable by life imprisonment.3  Re-
                                                
 3 Ala. Const. art. I, § 16; Alaska Const. art I, § 11; Ariz. 
Const. art. II, § 22; Ark. Const. art. II, § 8; Colo. Const. art. II, 
§ 19; Conn. Const. art. I, § 8; Del. Const. art. I, § 12; Idaho 
Const. art. I, § 6; Ill. Const. art. I, § 9; Ind. Const. art. I, § 17; 
Iowa Const. art. I, § 12; Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 9; Ky. 
Const. § 16; La. Const. art. I, § 18; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 
§ 20D; Me. Const. art. I, § 10; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7; Miss. 
Const. art. III, § 29; Mo. Const. art. I, § 20; Mont. Const. art. II, 
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view is needed to resolve the conflict the decision be-
low creates with this Court’s precedent on an exceed-
ingly important issue of constitutional law that af-
fects the criminal justice system, crime victims, and 
community safety in States across the Nation. 
This Court’s review is especially needed because 
of the exceedingly serious implications for victims 
and their communities if the judgment below is per-
mitted to stand.  Given sex offenders’ frighteningly 
high recidivism rates, and the life-altering harm suf-
fered by their victims, Arizona’s legislature was en-
tirely reasonable when it opted to categorically deny 
bail to sexual-assault defendants on the ground that 
sexual assault is an adequate proxy for future dan-
gerousness—and to build in procedural protections 
that go above and beyond in ensuring due process.  
The Constitution does not prohibit States like Arizo-
na and others from taking these steps to ensure sex 
offenders are brought to justice, victims are protect-
ed, and communities are safeguarded. 
                                                
§ 21; N.D. Const. art. I, § 11; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 597:1-c; N.M. 
Const. art. II, § 13; Neb. Const. art. I, § 9; Nev. Const. art. I, § 7; 
Ohio Const. art. I, § 9; Or. Const. art. I, § 14; Pa. Const. art. I, 
§ 14; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 8; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15; Tex. 
Const. art. I, § 11; Utah Const. art. I, § 8; Wash. Const. art. I, 
§ 20; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 14. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SEXUAL ASSAULT IS A SUFFICIENT PROXY 
FOR FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS. 
It is well established that government has a “le-
gitimate and compelling * * * interest in preventing 
crime by arrestees.”  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749.  Ac-
cordingly, a State can categorically deny bail based 
on the charged offense if it can show that defendants 
charged with that offense categorically present “a 
continuing danger to the community.”  Ibid.  Arizona 
has made its task even easier by limiting the denial 
of bail to those cases in which a court finds the “proof 
is evident or the presumption great” that the defend-
ant committed the charged offense. 
As over 80 percent of Arizona’s electorate recog-
nized in approving Proposition 103, sexual assault is 
precisely such a crime.  Sex offenders have such a 
“high rate of recidivism” that they present a “sub-
stantial risk” of future “dangerousness as a class.”  
Smith, 538 U.S. at 103.  And the magnitude of the 
harm inflicted by these particularly heinous crimes 
further compels the conclusion that sex offenders 
categorically present a danger to the community—a 
danger that justifies their incapacitation pending 
trial, at least where the proof of their guilt is evident. 
A. Sex Offenders Reoffend At Alarmingly 
High Rates. 
A substantial body of academic literature, sup-
ported by data collected by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, confirms that sex offenders reoffend at ex-
tremely high rates—regardless of how reoffending is 
defined (convictions versus arrests), and regardless 
of subsequent offense—be it another sex crime, a dif-
12 
 
ferent violent crime, or any other type of subsequent 
crime. 
Studies have found that 17 percent of sex offend-
ers were convicted of another sex offense within five 
years of release—with 21 percent reconvicted within 
ten years.  See, e.g., Andrew J.R. Harris & R. Karl 
Hanson, Sex Offender Recidivism:  A Simple Question 
2004–03 7 (Pub. Safety & Emergency Preparedness 
Can. 2004), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/ 
pblctns/sx-ffndr-rcdvsm/sx-ffndr-rcdvsm-eng.pdf (ob-
serving that offenders with prior sex-crime convic-
tions were twice as likely to recidivate); see also Rog-
er Przybylski, Adult Sex Offender Recidivism, in Sex 
Offender Mgmt. Assessment & Planning Initiative 
107, 111–15, 121 (DOJ 2017), https://smart.gov/SOMAPI/ 
pdfs/SOMAPI_Full%20Report.pdf (“The observed sex-
ual recidivism rates of sex offenders range from 
about 5 percent after three years to about 24 percent 
after 15 years.”). 
The recidivism rates are even higher for subse-
quent arrests of sex offenders for any type of crime—
an important statistic because “policies aimed at 
public protection should also be concerned with the 
likelihood of any form of serious recidivism, not just 
sexual recidivism.”  R. Karl Hanson & Kelly Morton-
Bourgon, Predictors of Sexual Recidivism:  An Up-
dated Meta-Analysis 2004–02 4 (Pub. Safety & 
Emergency Preparedness Can. 2004), https://www. 
publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2004-02-prdctrs-sxl 
-rcdvsm-pdtd/2004-02-prdctrs-sxl-rcdvsm-pdtd-eng.pdf.4 
                                                
 4 In addition, studies show “that some crimes legally labeled 
as nonsexual in the criminal histories of sex offenders may in-
deed be sexual in their underlying behavior.”  Przybylski, Adult 
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For example, an analysis of 400,000 state prison-
ers found that 21 percent of sex offenders were rear-
rested for a crime within six months of release, 31 
percent were rearrested within one year, 44 percent 
within two years, 51 percent within three years, and 
60 percent within five years.  Matthew R. Durose et 
al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 
2005:  Patterns from 2005 to 2010 8 (DOJ 2014), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf; 
see also Patrick A. Langan et al., Recidivism of Sex 
Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 2, 13 (DOJ 
2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf 
(24 percent of sex offenders reconvicted of new of-
fense within three years).  Those rates are 10 percent 
higher than the rate at which murderers were rear-
rested over the same period.  Durose et al., Recidi-
vism of Prisoners at 8. 
Indeed, one study shows that over a five-year pe-
riod, 21.4 percent of sex offenders were rearrested for 
violent offenses—nearly identical to the 21.7 percent 
of homicide convicts who were rearrested for violent 
offenses during that same period.  See Matthew R. 
Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 
States in 2005:  Patterns from 2005 to 2010—
Supplemental Tables 2 (DOJ 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510_st.pdf; see also Langan 
et al., Recidivism of Sex Offenders at 34 (17 percent 
of sex offenders rearrested for violent offenses within 
three years of release). 
                                                
Sex Offender Recidivism at 108 (although murder and kidnap-
ping are not inherently sexual, “when perpetrated by sex of-
fenders, [they are] usually sexually motivated”). 
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Further giving credence to Arizonans’ concern 
about sexual-assault defendants “endangering others 
while awaiting trial,” Pet. App. 9, a Department of 
Justice study found that a significant number of sex 
offenders—14 percent—not only reoffend, but also do 
so while out on bail.  Brian A. Reaves, Felony De-
fendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009—Statistical 
Tables 15, 17, 20–21 (DOJ 2013), https://www.bjs 
.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf (52 percent of sexual-
assault defendants were released pending trial).5  By 
comparison, none of the murder defendants who 
were released pending trial were rearrested.  Ibid. 
(noting that 18 percent of murder defendants were 
released pending trial); see also Thomas H. Cohen & 
Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants in Large Ur-
ban Counties, 2006 9 (DOJ 2010), https://www.bjs 
.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf (reporting similar 
statistics three years earlier—9 percent of released 
rapists were rearrested before trial; no released 
murderer was).6  And it is well established that 
                                                
 5 This study defines rape consistent with Arizona’s definition 
of sexual assault.  Compare id. at 34, with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 13-1406(A), -1401(A)(4). 
 6 Even these already high recidivism rates “are underesti-
mates of the true reoffense rates” for at least two reasons.  
Przybylski, Adult Sex Offender Recidivism at 108–09.  First, no 
study purports to identify every time a sex offender reoffends, 
which would be all but impossible.  Instead, studies rely on offi-
cially recorded metrics, like subsequent arrests.  Ibid. (“Because 
these official statistics reflect only offenses that come to the at-
tention of authorities, they are a diluted measure of reoffend-
ing.”).  Second, sex crimes themselves are significantly un-
derreported, with studies finding that fewer than one-third of 
victims contact the police.  See ibid.; Rachel E. Morgan & Grace 
Kena, Criminal Victimization, 2016 7 (DOJ 2017), https://www 
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16.pdf (23 percent of rapes and sexu-
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States can categorically deny bail to murder defend-
ants.  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753; Carlson v. Landon, 
342 U.S.524, 545–46 (1952). 
Given the breadth of academic literature and 
Department of Justice studies further demonstrating 
“that recidivism rates among sex offenders are high-
er than the average for other types of criminals,” Ke-
bodeaux, 570 U.S. at 395–96 (citing studies), it is 
hardly surprising that this Court has repeatedly rec-
ognized that releasing sex offenders into the commu-
nity is a perilous gamble.  See Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 
(noting the “dangerousness” of sex offenders “as a 
class” due to their “frightening and high” recidivism 
rates).  Indeed, when “convicted sex offenders reenter 
society, they are much more likely than any other 
type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or 
sexual assault.”  McKune, 536 U.S. at 33. 
B. The Harm Threatened By Sex-Offender 
Recidivism Is Particularly Heinous 
And Damaging To Victims And Com-
munities. 
Sexual assault “is a deplorable crime that endan-
gers and dehumanizes victims.”  Pet. App. 11.  “Short 
of homicide, it is the ‘ultimate violation of self.’”  
Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.  The Arizona electorate did 
not run afoul of due process by deciding that to allow 
a sexual-assault defendant—whose proof of guilt is 
evident, as established by a court after an adversari-
al proceeding—to remain free pending trial presents 
                                                
al assaults reported to police); see also Michael Planty et al., 
Female Victims of Sexual Violence, 1994–2010 6 (DOJ 2013), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf (slightly more 
than one-third of rapes and sexual assaults reported). 
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a substantial risk of imposing further harm on both 
the victim and the community as a whole. 
The harm inflicted by sex offenders extends well 
beyond the over 320,000 annual victims of sexual as-
sault.  Because sexual assault “undermines the 
community’s sense of security, there is public injury 
as well.”  Id. at 598.  In short, “sexual violence tears 
at the fabric of community well-being.”  Nat’l Sexual 
Violence Res. Ctr., Impact of Sexual Violence:  Fact 
Sheet 2 (2010), http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/ 
files/NSVRC_Publicication_Factsheet_Impact-of-sexual 
-violence.pdf. 
In recognition of the catastrophic harms they 
cause, this Court has stated—in no uncertain 
terms—that “[s]ex offenders are a serious threat in 
this Nation.”  Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 1, 3 (2003) (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 32).  
When “sex offenders reenter society, they are much 
more likely than any other type of offender to be re-
arrested for a new rape or sexual assault.”  Packing-
ham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1739 (2017) 
(quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 33).  Indeed, sex of-
fenders’ “deliberate viciousness * * * may be greater 
than that of the murderer”—especially when one 
considers the victims who are left “so grievously in-
jured physically or psychologically that life is beyond 
repair.”  Coker, 433 U.S. at 603 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
Given sex offenders’ alarmingly high recidivism 
rates—and the profound harm suffered by victims 
and communities—Arizona’s electorate acted well 
within the bounds of due process when it opted to 
categorically deny bail to sexual-assault defendants 
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on the ground that sexual assault is an adequate 
proxy for future dangerousness (after judicial pro-
ceedings to determine that the proof of assault is ev-
ident).  Further, by keeping dangerous criminals in-
capacitated pending trial, Proposition 103 also 
vindicates the state-constitutionally protected rights 
of victims to be free from intimidation, harassment, 
and abuse while the criminal trial proceeds.  And be-
cause Proposition 103 only applies if a court—after a 
full adversarial hearing—finds that the proof of the 
defendant’s guilt is evident, it goes above and beyond 
the demands of due process. 
II. DEFENDANTS FACING SEXUAL ASSAULT 
CHARGES PRESENT SERIOUS FLIGHT RISKS. 
In addition to presenting a danger to the com-
munity, “an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial 
if he presents a risk of flight.”  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 
749 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979)).  
As a matter of common sense and human nature, the 
more severe the potential punishment, the higher 
the risk that a defendant will flee rather than face 
trial.  Sexual-assault convictions certainly raise the 
specter of severe punishments—especially consider-
ing not only the possibility of a lengthy prison sen-
tence, but also the serious collateral consequences, 
including involuntary commitment and sex-offender 
registration.  
The punishment for sexual assault in Arizona, as 
in many States, “ranges from 5.25 years’ imprison-
ment to life imprisonment.”  Pet. App. 11.  See Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 13-1406(B) (no “suspension of sentence, 
probation, pardon or release from confinement * * * 
until the sentence imposed by the court has been 
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served”); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1406(D) (“if 
the sexual assault involved the intentional or know-
ing infliction of serious physical injury, the person 
may be sentenced to life imprisonment”).7 
In addition to lengthy prison sentences, sexual 
assault convictions are accompanied by severe collat-
eral consequences—involuntary civil commitment 
and sex-offender registration—each of which is suffi-
cient to justify categorically denying bail based on 
flight risk. 
First, a sex offender’s confinement does not nec-
essarily conclude at the end of a lengthy prison sen-
tence:  “[A]t the completion of a prison sentence a de-
fendant faces potential commitment to the Arizona 
State Hospital as a sexually violent person for an in-
definite period of time.”  Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 
1003, 1012 n.14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (Gould, J., dis-
senting) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-3701 et seq.).8 
                                                
 7 Other states impose similar penalties for similar sex offens-
es.  E.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.125(i)(1) (presumptive twenty-to-
thirty years’ imprisonment, ninety-nine-year maximum); Mont. 
Code § 45-5-503(1)–(2) (up to life); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-
319(1)(a), -105(1) (up to fifty years); Tenn. Stat. §§ 39-13-
502(a)(2), -503(a)(2), 40-35-111(b)(1)–(2) (eight-to-sixty years); 
Utah Code § 76-5-402 (five years to life); Vt. Stat. tit. 13, § 3252 
(three years to life); Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(1)–(2), 939.50(3)(b)–
(c) (up to sixty years). 
 8 Arizona is by no means an outlier in this respect.  Nineteen 
other states—along with the federal government—also subject 
convicted sex offenders to potential involuntary commitment 
after they have served their sentences.  See Jeslyn A. Miller, 
Sex Offender Civil Commitment:  The Treatment Paradox, 98 
Cal. L. Rev. 2093, 2128 nn.21–22 (2010) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 36-3701 to -3717; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600–09.3; Fla. 
Stat. §§ 394.910–394.932; 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/1.01 to /12; 
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On several occasions, this Court has upheld state 
laws that permit the involuntary civil commitment of 
sex offenders—even after they have served their 
criminal sentence.  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997) (“an individual’s constitu-
tionally protected interest in avoiding physical re-
straint may be overridden even in the civil context”); 
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).  Indeed, “the 
practical effect of [involuntary commitment statutes] 
may be to impose confinement for life.”  Hendricks, 
521 U.S. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Second, “[e]very U.S. state, the District of Co-
lumbia, the five principal U.S. territories, and over 
125 federally recognized Indian tribes” require sex 
offenders to register as such.  Office of Sex Offender 
Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, 
and Tracking (SMART), Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification in the United States:  Current Case 
Law and Issues 1 (DOJ 2018), https://smart.gov/ 
caselaw/Case-Law-Update-2018-Compiled.pdf (“Con-
gress has enacted various measures setting ‘mini-
                                                
Iowa Code § 229A.1 et seq.; Kan. Stat. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a22; 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, §§ 1–16; Minn. Stat. § 253B.01 et 
seq.; Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480–632.513; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-
1201 to -1226; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 135-E et seq.; N.J. Stat. §§ 30:4-
27.26 to -27.38; N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01 et seq.; N.D. 
Cent. Code §§ 25-03.3-01 to -44; 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 6401–09; S.C. 
Code §§ 44-48-10 to -170; Tex. Health & Safety Code 
§§ 841.001–841.007; Va. Code §§ 37.2-900 to -921; Wash. Rev. 
Code §§ 71.09.010–71.09.903; Wis. Stat. §§ 980.01–980.14; 18 
U.S.C. § 4248); see also Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Expert Testi-
mony in Sexually Violent Predator Commitments:  Conceptual-
izing Legal Standards of “Mental Disorder” and “Likely To 
Reoffend,” 31 J. Am. Acad. Psych. & L. 471, 472, 484 (2003) (cit-
ing statutes). 
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mum standards’ for jurisdictions to implement in 
their sex offender registration or notifications sys-
tems.”).   
Taking Arizona as an example, convicted sex of-
fenders have ten days to register.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 13-3821(A)–(B).  States use this registration to 
“maintain an internet sex offender website,” which 
includes offenders’ names, pictures, addresses, and 
offenses of conviction.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3827(A)–
(B).  In addition, if a sex offender moves, he must no-
tify authorities of his new address “in person and in 
writing” within seventy-two hours of the move.  Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 13-3822(A).  Authorities then have 45 
days to “notify the community of the offender’s pres-
ence in the community.”  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-
3825(D).  That notification “must be disseminated in 
a nonelectronic format to the surrounding neighbor-
hood, area schools, appropriate community groups 
and prospective employers”—and a “press release 
* * * must be given to the local electronic and print 
media to enable information to be placed in a local 
publication.”  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3825(C)(1). 
In many States, including Arizona, sex offenders 
must update their registration at least annually—for 
life.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3821(J), (M).9  Failing to 
comply is a felony.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3824(A). 
                                                
 9 See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 15-20A-3, -10; Cal. Penal Code §§ 290, 
290.012; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-22-103, -108; Fla. Stat. 
§ 943.0435(11), (14); Ga. Code § 42-1-12(f); Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§ 846E-2; Idaho Code §§ 18-8307, -8310; Mo. Stat. §§ 589.400.4(3), 
589.414.7(2)(c); Mont. Code §§ 46-23-504, -506; Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 29-4005(b)(iii), -4001.01(1); N.M. Stat. §§ 29-11A-4(L)(1), -5(D); 
42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.15(a)(3), (e), 9799.14(d)(5); Tenn. Stat. 
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Further, registered sex offenders “experience a 
range of unintended negative consequences that typ-
ically have stronger impacts upon sex offenders than 
other felons.”  Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home:  
The Unintended Collateral Consequences of Sex Of-
fender Residency Restrictions, 42 Harv. C.R.–C.L.L. 
Rev. 531, 532 (2007) (collecting studies).  As this 
Court has recognized, these collateral consequences 
include “humiliation” and “public shame.”  See Smith, 
538 U.S. at 99.  They also include “exclusion from 
jobs or housing, harassment, and physical harm,” id. 
at 109 & n.* (Souter, J., concurring), and “severe 
stigma.”  Id. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
id. at 115–16 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (registration “calls to mind shaming pun-
ishments once used to mark an offender as someone 
to be shunned”). 
In sum, while the lengthy sentences for sexual 
assault alone create a significant, well-recognized 
flight risk, when considered in tandem with the po-
tential for indefinite involuntary commitment and a 
lifelong registration requirement, it becomes even 
clearer that categorically denying bail for defendants 
facing trial for sexual assault is amply justified by 
the risk that they will flee rather than face justice. 
* * * 
Measures like Proposition 103 protect victims’ 
rights, bring offenders to justice, and safeguard 
communities.  They do not offend due process, be-
cause the high risk that a sex offender will reoffend, 
                                                
§§ 40-39-207(g)(1)(B), -202(31)(B); Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45, 940.225(2); 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-19-302, -304. 
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combined with the devastating harm to victims and 
communities and the high risk of flight, justifies the 
determination that—certainly where the proof is evi-
dent or presumption great—defendants charged with 
sexual assault are categorically ineligible for bail.  If 
permitted to stand, the decision below will deprive 
the States of a badly needed tool for keeping sexual 
assault victims and communities safe.  Because noth-
ing in the Constitution requires—much less per-
mits—that untoward result, the petition should be 
granted and the judgment reversed.  
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should 
grant the petition for writ of certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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